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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 




TION COMPANY, a 
corporation 
Respondent. 
Case No. 8615 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
S'TATEJ\1:E~TT OF FACTS 
This case involves an automobile collision which 
occurred on January 26, 1955, at approximately 
8:35 P.M. at the intersection of Main Street and 
Robert Avenue (2430 South) in Salt Lake City, 
Utah. There is no traffic control at said inter-
section for vehicles proceeding North and South 
on Main Street. There are stop signs located on 
Robert Avenue to control traffic proceeding East or 
West on Robert Avenue at its intersection with 
Main Street. 
Chester William Wright, plaintiff and appel-
lant, was proceeding North on Main Street, in the 
outside lane, at a speed of thirty to thirty-five 
miles per hour. Respondent was proceeding East 
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on Robert A7enue. Wright first observed the Re-
spondent's vehicle from a distance of 90 feet away 
and at that time Wright contends the vehicle was 
just entering the intersection. Upon observing Re-
spondent's vehicle entering the intersection, Wright 
immediately applied his brakes. His vehicle struck 
an icy portion of the street and skidded into Respon-
dent's vehicle, the point of impact being near the 
center of the intersection. Main Street was clear 
and dry except for a portion thereof adjoining the 
intersection where the shadow of a building ap-
parently covered the street preventing the thin 
layer of ice thereon from melting. The aforesaid 
building is virtually on the property line of Main 
Street and presents an obstruction to the view of 
the driver on Robert Avenue from observing traffic 
proceeding North on Main Street and approaching 
the intersection with Robert Avenue. Respondent 
contends that its driver had either stopped at the 
stop sign and then was proceeding out into the 
intersection or did not stop at the stop sign and was 
proceeding out into the intersection beyond the 
building to look down Main Street when the acci-
dent occurred and was in the process of stopping 
at the time of impact. (R 1, 2, 5). 
Based upon the foregoing facts, which were 
presented by counsel at pre-trial, the trial judge 
conCluded that the statements of counsel presented 
no jury questions and the :ase was dismissed. (R 7). 1 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE 
CASE AT PRE-TRIAL, BASED UPON COUNSEL'S 
STATEMENT OF FACTS. THE CASE SHOULD HAVE 
BEEN PERMITTED TO PROCEED TO TRIAL AND 
DISPUTED QUESTIONS OF FACT REGARDING NEG-
LIGENCE SUBMITTED TO THE JURY FOR DETER-
MINATION. THE FOLLOWING QUES'TIONS OF FACT 
SHOULD PROPERLY BE SUBMITTED TO THE JURY 
FOR DETERMINATION: 
(a) WHICH PARTY HAD RIGHT OF WAY AT 
INTERSECTION? WAS PLAINTIFF AP-
PROACHING INTERSECTION WI T H I N 
SUCH PROXIMITY THERETO AS TO BE 
CONSIDERED WITHIN THE RANGE OF 
IMMEDIATE HAZARD, THEREBY MAK-
ING DEFENDANT NEGLIGENT IN AT-
TEMPTING TO ENTER SAID INTERSEC-
TION? 
(b) DID DEFENDANT COME TO A COMPLETE 
STOP IN OBEDIENCE TO STOP SIGN? IF 
DEFENDANT DID STOP, WAS SUCH STOP 
AT THE ENTRANCE TO INTERSECTION 
AS REQUIRED BY STATUTE AND WAS 
SUCH STOP OTHERWISE SUFFICIENT 
TO COMPLY WITH REQUIREMENTS OF 
SECTION 41-6-7 4 UCA, 1953? 
(c) PROXIMATE CAUSE OF COLLISION. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE 
CASE AT PRE-TRIAL, BASED UPON COUNSEL'S 
STATEMENT OF FACTS. THE CASE SHOULD HAVE 
BEEN PERMITTED TO PROCEED TO TRIAL AND 
-DISPUTED QUESTIONS OF FACT REGARDING NEG-
LIGENCE SUBMITTED TO THE JURY FOR DETER-
MINATION. THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS OF FACT 
SHOULD PROPERLY BE SUBMITTED TO THE JURY 
FOR DETERMINATION: 
(a) WHICH PARTY HAD RIGHT OF WAY AT 
INTERSECTION? WAS PLAINTIFF AP-
PROACHING INTERSECTION WI THIN 
SUCH PROXIMITY THERETO AS TO BE 
CONSIDERED WITHIN THE RANGE OF 
IMMEDIATE HAZARD, THEREBY MAK-
ING DEFENDANT NEGLIGENT IN AT-
TEMPTING TO ENTER SAID INTERSEC-
TION? 
(b) DID DEFENDANT COlVIE TO A COMPLETE 
STOP IN OBEDIENCE TO STOP SIGN? IF 
DEFENDANT DID STOP, WAS SUCH STOP 
AT THE ENTRANCE TO INTERSECTION 
AS REQUIRED BY STATUTE AND WAS 
SUCH STOP OTHERWISE SUFFICIENT 
TO COMPLY WITH REQUIREMENTS OF 
SECTION 41-6-74 UCA, 1953? 
(c) PROXIMATE CAUSE OF COLLISION. 
The appellant herein contends that the limited 
evidence presented to the trial court, at pre-trial, 
pres en ted sufficient questions of fact regarding 
negligence of the parties to be submitted to the 
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jury for determination and such evidence did not 
warrant a dismissal of the case at pre-trial. 
Section 41-6-7 4 U CA, 1953 provides : 
VEHICLE ENTERING A THROUGH 
HIGHWAY. The driver of a vehicle shall stop 
as required by this act at the en trance to a 
through highway and shall yield the right of 
way to other vehicles which have entered 
the intersection from said through highway 
or which are approaching so closely on said 
through highway as to constitute an immedi-
ate hazard, but said driver having so yielded 
may proceed and the drivers of all other ve-
hicles approaching the intersection on said 
through highway shall yield the right of way 
to the vehicle so proceeding in to or across 
the through highway. 
(b) The driver of a vehicle shall like-
wise stop in obedience to a stop sign as re-
quired herein at an intersection where a stop 
sign is erected at one or more entrances 
thereto although not a part of a through high-
way and shall proceed cautiously, yielding 
to vehicles not so obliged to stop which are 
within the intersection or approaching so 
closely as to constitute an immediate hazard, 
but may then proceed. 
There is no evidence in the record regarding the 
Respondent driver's first observation of Appellant's 
approaching automobile. The Appellant first ob-
served the Respondent when the two cars were 
ninety feet apart and at that time Appellant was 
travelling thirty to thirty-five miles per hour and 
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Respondent Y7as t:ra7elling ve-ry slowly entering the 
intersection (R 2). The Appellant contends that 
under such circumstances, a jury could properly 
find that the Respondent was negligent in failing tJ 
yield the right of way to Appellant in that Appel-
lant was approaching the intersection so closely 
as to constitute an immediate hazard. This posi-
tion is stated in American Juris prudence as follows: 
5A Am Jur, Automobiles, Sec. 327. 
YIELDING RIGHT OF WAY.*** (P. 433) 
It is frequently provided by statute that a 
motorist approaching a highway which is 
protected by stop signs must yield the right 
of vvay to vehicles approaching so closely as 
to constitute an immediate hazard, the ques-
tion whether a particular vehicle constituted 
such a hazard in a particular case being one 
for the jury. 
Assuming that defendant had stopped at the 
stop sign, or that he had stopped at a point nearer 
the intersection thereby avoiding the obstruction 
to his vie·w caused by a building on the corner of 
the intersection, he was still negligent in failing to 
yield the right of way to plaintiff. The mere act of 
stopping, without more, could not discharge the de-
fendant driver's duty to vehicles travelling on the 
through street. He had the further duty of looking 
for oncoming traffic and yielding the right of way 
to those vehicles within the range of hazard. In 
Hickok v. Skinner, 190 P.2d 514, this court held 
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that a driver must do more than rnerely stop at a 
traffic signal in order to discharge his duty of due 
care. He must, after stopping, continue to appraise 
the traffic situation to determine whether or not it 
is safe to proceed. In Justice Vvolfe's dissenting 
opinion, at page 514, he states: "Whether an ap-
proaching driver is so close to the intersection as to 
constitute an immediate hazard is largely a question 
of human judgment, and will depend upon a num-
ber of factors, e.g. width of intersection, speed of 
intersection, speed of approaching automobile, visi-
bility conditions, whether the road is dry or slippery, 
and many other factors. And slnce the relative 
rights and duties of drivers approaching an inter-
section such as this depends to a large extent upon 
the exercise of human judgment, I am inclined to 
the opinion that the question of whether or not the 
judgment exercised by the drivers was reasonable, 
is a question of fact for the jury". 
In Smith vs. Lenzi, 279 Pac. 893, this court 
held, in an intersection case, that the speed that the 
cars were approaching, their distance from the point 
of intersection, the ability of the respective drivers 
to see, were all factors to be considered by the jury 
in determining whether appellant or respondent was 
entitled to the right of ·way. There are numerous 
cases from other states, notably California, involv-
ing intersection accidents as in the instant case, 
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wherein the Courts have held, under a right-of-way 
statute identical with the Utah statute, that a jury 
question is presented in determining whether or not 
a vehiCle is approaching so closely as to constitute 
an immediate hazard. Zwerin vs. Riverside Cement 
Co. 126 P.2d 920 (Calif.) ; Von Cise vs. Lencioni, 
235 P.2d 236 (Calif.) ; and Mason vs. San Diego 
Electric Ry., 133 P.2d 341 (Calif.). 
The testimony in the record, while asserting 
that Respondent's driver stopped for the stop sign, 
fails to establish the point at which he stopped. 
The record indicates (R 2, 5) that the Respondent's 
driver did stop at the stop sign and then was either 
proceeding very slowly past the building obstruct-
ing. his view or stopped again at a point past the 
building. 'l'he record then indicates (R 5, 6) that 
the driver did not stop at the stop sign but pro-
ceeded slowly past the stop sign and stopped at 
the property line past the building. There is testi-
mony in the record that there is a building on the 
corner at the intersection that obstructs the view 
of Main Street for a driver proceeding East on 
Robert Avenue, (R 2). The appellant contends that 
if a stop was made, it was made at the stop sign, 
at a point from which the defendant's driver could 
not observe approaching traffic on Main Street and, 
conversely, vehicles proceeding North on Main 
Street could not observe the stopped vehicle on 
Robert Avenue. The duty prescribed by the statute, 
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Section 41-6-7 4, is that the driver stop at the en-
trance to the through highway. The Appellant first 
observed Respondent's driver moving into the in-
tersection and did not observe him stopped at the 
entrance to the intersection or at any other place. 
In view of the vague testimony in the record, the 
matter should properly be submitted to a jury to 
determine whether or not Respondent's driver com-
plied with the requirements of the statute in stop-
ping at the entrance to the intersection. 
The statute does not prescribe the exact point 
at which a driver is required to stop, it only pre-
scribes that the stop must be made at the entrance 
to the intersection. 0 bviously, the intent of the legis-
lature must have been that the stop be made at a 
point where the driver can fully observe approach-
ing traffic on the through highway and also where 
the driver on the through highway can fu1ly ob-
serve the motorist on the secondary road. A driver 
could not possibly ascertain whether or not ap-
proaching automobiles constitute an immediate haz-
ard unless he is in a position to observe such ap-
proaching automobiles. In the absence of definite 
evidence regarding the point of stopping, there is 
no evidence that Respondent fully complied with 
the aforementioned statute. The Appellant con-
tends that the respondent driver's failure to stop at 
a point where he could observe, and be observed, 
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constituted negligence which proximately caused 
the accident. 
The standard of care required in such circum-
stances has been stated in 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles, 
Sec. 350 b ( 2), as follows: 
Visibility; obstruction of view (P. 830). 
Visibility at the intersection is a factor to 
be considered in determining the care to be 
exercised by a driver at an intersection. A 
driver whose view is obscured or obstructed 
is particularly under a duty to use due care; 
ordinarily itj_s. incumbent on him to exercise 
more caution· than would be required if his 
view were unobstructed, and the standard of 
care in such event"has been laid down as ex-
treme care, or the care that a very prudent 
person would exercise under the same or simi-
lar circumstances. 
In regards to the place of stopping for a stop 
s1gn, 60 C.J .S. Motor Vehicles, Sec. 353, states: 
'Time, Place and Character of Observa-
tion - Time and Place. While there is no 
arbitrary rule as to the time at which, or the 
particular point from which, the driver is 
obligated to look, due care requires him to 
look at a time when and place where obser-
vation will be reasonably efficient for pro-
tection * * * he should look at a time and 
place when looking will reasonably apprise a 
reasonably careful person of the conditions 
confronting him at the intersection, so that 
he may control his actions accordingly. 
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It is incumbent upon a motorist on an 
unfavored highway, before entering an ar-
terial highway or street, to stop and make 
his observation at a place or position where 
that observation will be effective to disclose 
approaching traffic. Generally speaking, his 
duty is to stop at a point somewhere between 
the stop sign and the arterial highway where 
he may effectively observe traffic approach-
ing on the arterial highway. 
In Gartrell vs. Harris, 187 SW2d 1019 (Ky), 
the court held that whether a motorist reasonably 
exercised judgment in selection of a point at which 
to make his stop before entering intersection with 
through highway was a question of fact for the jury. 
Before entering intersection with through highway, 
his auto must be stopped at a place where the view 
is sufficiently clear to permit observation of ap-
proaching traffic and driver should not proceed into 
intersection until he can do so with safety. 
In Cameron vs. Goree, 189 P .2d 596 (Ore.), 
involving a similar fact situation as the instant 
case, and an identical right of way statute, the court 
held as follows: Obviously, yielding the right of way 
to cars with which a collision would otherwise occur 
is the chief objective of the stop requirement. A 
motorist upon a secondary way must, therefore, do 
three things : ( 1) stop, ( 2) look and ( 3) yield the 
right of way to cars within the range of hazard. 
The third duty makes it manifest that the legisla-
11 
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ture in tended that 1wlle stop must be made where an 
adequate view is obtainable. VIe are convinced that 
our traffic act means that drivers upon laterals 
must stop where they can see not only the cars in 
the intersection but also those approaching upon 
the trunk highway. 
The Utah Court held in Bullock vs. Luke, 98 
P.2d 350, that there is no arbitrary rule as to the 
time and p1ace of looking for vehicles on an inter-
secting road and no particular distance from inter-
section is prescribed for that purpose, but general 
standards are that observation should be made at 
first opportunity and at a point where observation 
will be reasonably efficient for, and conducive to, 
protection. 
In Elmore vs. Lassen County, 51 P.2d 481 
(Calif.) ·the court held that the driver of an auto-
mobile entering a through highway did not fulfill 
his duty or comply with the right of way statute 
by stopping at a point from which his view of the 
through highway was obstructed and from which 
point he could not ascertain if a vehicle was ap-
proaching so closely from the left as to constitute 
an immediate hazard. 
The Appellant contends the foregoing decisions 
are applicable in the instant case and that the suf-
ficiency of the respondent's stop, if any, is not es-
tablished by the testimony in the record and in the 
12 
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absence of such testimony the Trial Court erred in 
finding the respondent free of negligence. Appellant 
contends that respondent's driver did not make a 
stop in compliance with the statute and that such 
action constituted negligence which proximately 
caused the resulting collision. 
CONCLUSION 
'The Appellant submits that the issues respect-
ing negligence in this matter should be submitted 
to a jury for determination and that the trial court 
was in error in dismissing the appellant's case at 
pre-trial. Appellant respectfully requests that this 
court reverse the judgment of dismissal entered by 
the Trial Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT GORDON 
J. GRANT IVERSON 
Attorneys for Appellant 
13 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
